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MAURICIO DRELICHMAN AND HANS-JOACHIM VOTH 
 
The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign 
debt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, deriving 
comprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archival 
data. The king’s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising. 
Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip’s reign. 
Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of other 
early modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, including 
Britain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises, 
and were not a sign of unsustainable debts. 
 
pain under the Habsburgs ruled an empire on which the sun never 
set. Its financial troubles appear to have stretched equally far. 
Castile—Habsburg Spain’s dominant kingdom—was the first “serial 
defaulter” in history.
1 Philip II failed to honor his debts four times,   
in 1557, 1560, 1575, and 1596. Historians have emphasized the 
hopelessness of Castile’s fiscal position.
2 Fernand Braudel famously 
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1 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, “Debt.” 
2 According to Thompson, “Castile: Polity,” Castile suffered from “an unbridgeable gap 
between unavoidable expenditure and disposable income.” See also Lovett, “General Settlement.” 
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argued that only the indulgence of irrational bankers allowed Castile to 
incur towering debts at a time when its fiscal position was deteriorating.
3 
Fighting a series of expensive wars in a bid for European hegemony, 
public finances were heavily strained. Spain eventually came to hold  
the all-time record for the number of government bankruptcies, having 
failed to meet its obligations 13 times between 1500 and 1900. There is a 
widespread belief that military expenditures eventually overburdened the 
economy, resulting in “imperial overstretch.”
4  
 While  Spain’s numerous defaults between 1556 and 1900 are   
widely cited in the literature on sovereign debt crises, we know 
relatively little about Castile’s fiscal position from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Evidence on tax revenues, expenditure, and debt is 
fragmentary. Philip II himself—like most early modern rulers— 
had very limited information about the state of his finances. The 
decentralized nature of early modern states, combined with rudimentary 
information collection, hinders attempts at reconstruction. Assessing   
the overall fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, therefore, requires the 
painstaking collection of data from scattered sources, and the use of 
careful assumptions regarding the nature of missing data. 
  In this article, we reconstruct the earliest set of annual fiscal   
accounts for any sovereign state in history. We provide estimates of 
overall debt, debt servicing, revenue, and expenditure in Philip II’s 
Castile for the period 1566 to 1596. Our starting point is a new   
data series of the Crown’s short-term debts, compiled from archival 
documents held in the Archive of Simancas. When combined with 
existing data, this series serves as the linchpin of our reconstruction of 
the year-to-year movements in Philip II’s fiscal position. We derive 
yearly estimates of the budget deficit, the primary surplus, short-term 
borrowing, and the stock of long-term debt.
5  
  Our data can be used to evaluate debt sustainability. Philip’s debts did 
not exceed future discounted primary surpluses. Rising debt was met  
with rising revenue. Contrary to received wisdom, Philip II’s debts were 
sustainable throughout his reign. Castile’s fiscal position only weakened 
after the defeat of the “Invincible Armada,” and this deterioration was 
mild. Far from being undermined by reckless spending and weak fiscal 
institutions, Castile’s finances mainly suffered large, temporary shocks as 
a result of military events. 
 
3 Braudel, Mediterranean. 
4  Alvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, “Decline,” document Spain’s poor economic 
performance over the long run. See also Kennedy, Rise. 
5 Space constraints do not allow us to reproduce the reconstructed series here. An online 
version of the article, available on the authors’ web sites, reports the full series and provides 
complete details on the methodology employed.   Sustainable Debts 815 
  
  
  To put these findings in context, we compare Castile’s finances   
with those of other early modern European powers, such as France, 
Holland, and Britain. Castile ran primary surpluses larger than those in 
eighteenth-century Britain, which has long been regarded as a paragon 
of fiscal virtue.
6 This is all the more remarkable since Castile found 
itself almost continuously at war. Our findings suggest that earlier 
assessments of Philip’s finances have been too pessimistic. The overall 
health of Castile’s fiscal position, and the Crown’s ability to raise taxes 
and non-tax revenue, made continued borrowing possible.
7 Our finding 
also implies that the “defaults” reflected temporary liquidity shortfalls, 
and were not a sign of insolvency.
8 
  Our research is related to other work on early modern European   
state finances. Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff, and Miguel 
Savastano reconstruct the long-run history of debt and defaults since 
1500. Richard Bonney’s  European State Finance Database offers a 
comprehensive overview of existing data. Eugene White pioneered   
the use of primary surpluses as an analytic device in the context of  
early modern state borrowing. Other important contributions   
include the works of Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, and of 
Mark Ormrod, Richard Bonney, and Margaret Bonney. John Brewer 
examined the rise of the tax state in the United Kingdom in response to 
the fiscal exigencies brought on by war. François Velde has compiled 
detailed data on early-eighteenth-century France.
9 In combination, these 
works offer insights into the “sinews of power” of almost every nascent 
European national state. Castile has also attracted scholarly attention.
10 
Modesto Ulloa provides time series on revenue sources during Philip’s 
reign. Henri Lapeyre, Felipe Ruiz Martín, Ramón Carande, Miguel 
Artola, and Pilar Toboso Sánchez supply fragmentary evidence on   
short- and long-term debt. I. A. A. Thompson compiled snapshot data 
on expenditure for selected years.
11  
 
6 See Ferguson, Cash; and Brewer, Sinews. 
7 The reasons for the Crown’s willingness to repay are explored in Drelichman and Voth, 
“Lending to Borrower.” 
8 In this sense, Philip’s defaults would have been excusable in the sense of Grossman and Van 
Huyck, “Sovereign Debt.” 
9 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, “Debt”; Bonney, European State and Rise; White, “Was 
There a Solution?”; Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises; Ormrod, Bonney, and Bonney, Crises; 
Brewer, Sinews; and Velde, “John Law’s.” 
10 For the sixteenth century, the classic works are Ruiz Martín, “Expediente” and “Finanzas”; 
Ulloa, Hacienda; and Artola, Hacienda. More recently,  Bilbao, “Ensayo”; Thompson, “Castile: 
Polity”; Gelabert, “Castile”; Marcos Martín, España; Tortella and Comín, “Fiscal and Monetary 
Institutions”; Yun Casalilla, “Siglo” and Marte; and Alvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 
“Decline,” have contributed much to our understanding of Spanish economic and fiscal history. 
11 Ulloa,  Hacienda; Lapeyre, Simón Ruiz; Ruiz Martín, “Finanzas”; Carande, Carlos V; 
Artola, Hacienda; Toboso Sánchez, Deuda; and Thompson, War and Society. 816  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE WARS AND FINANCES OF PHILIP II 
 
  From 1556 to 1598 Philip II ruled the entire territory of modern- 
day Spain; Northern Catalonia (eventually ceded to France); large parts of 
the Low Countries; Naples, Sicily, and Milan; and the New World from 
Buenos Aires to Lower California (with the exception of Brazil). In 1571 
he acquired the Philippines and from 1580 he also ruled Portugal and its 
merchant empire. Spain itself consisted of several kingdoms. Castile was 
dominant, accounting for as much as 83 percent of the population.
12 In 
1479 the marriage of the Catholic kings joined the Crowns of Castile and 
Aragon.
13 Castile was given exclusive control over territory conquered in 
the future; the conquest of Spanish America, therefore, strengthened her 
position.  
  Both Castile and Aragon had representative assemblies, the Cortes. In 
the sixteenth century, the Cortes of Castile consisted of representatives 
from 18 major cities. These had to approve direct taxes (servicios),  
sales taxes (alcabalas), as well as a few additional income streams. 
Between 1555 and 1596 taxes subject to approval by the Cortes 
generated 43 percent of Crown revenue.
14 Taxes were classified by the 
Cortes as either “ordinary” or “extraordinary.” Since the Crown could 
only sell long-dated bonds backed by ordinary tax revenue, the Cortes 
effectively set a limit on issuance.
15 Tax payments were often fixed in 
nominal terms. Therefore, the price revolution of the sixteenth century 
created a need to increase these taxes. Requests to do so were not 
approved easily. The Cortes regularly negotiated the size of the change, 
attached conditions to it, and prolonged debate indefinitely if the king 
offered insufficient concessions.
16 
  Philip II twice faced strong opposition by the Cortes. In 1574 the 
king requested a tripling of the sales taxes. The Cortes stalled. A 
compromise emerged in 1575, too late to prevent a default on short-
term debt. Sales taxes were doubled, with an additional onetime levy. 
The extra revenue helped the Crown settle with its bankers. The second 
standoff between the king and the Cortes came in 1590, in the aftermath  
 
12 Nadal i Oller, Población. 
13 The union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile was not a full political merger—taxes, laws, 
and constitutional rules remained largely unchanged.  
14 The king could collect ecclesiastical revenue without the Cortes’ approval. Mining revenue 
was also part of the royal prerogative (Ulloa, Hacienda, pp. 83–87). The section on data discusses 
the composition of revenue in detail.  
15 Torres López and Pérez-Prendes, Juros. 
16  The literature on the Cortes is vast. Important treatments include Carretero Zamora,  
Cortes; Jago, “Habsburg Absolutism” and “Philip II”; Thompson, War and Society, Crown, and 
“Castile: Absolutism”; Fortea, Cortes; and the proceedings of the Congreso Científico sobre la 
Historia de las Cortes de Castilla y León (Las Cortes).   Sustainable Debts 817 
  
  
of the Armada. The king requested new excise taxes from the Cortes—
the millones. In response, the Cortes attached conditions limiting the 
king’s power to impose levies on cities. They also gained, for the 
first time, limited control over royal expenditure. In fiscal terms, royal 
power in Castile was thus far from absolute. The Cortes had little 
control over expenditure, but it could influence taxation to a large 
extent. Without them designating revenue as “ordinary,” no issuance of 
long-term debt was possible. The Crown’s relationship with the Cortes 
was therefore crucial for Castile’s fiscal position. 
  From the 1540s Spain received large inflows of silver from the New 
World. The Crown taxed all remittances at a flat rate of 20 percent. 
Silver revenue was volatile, and grew quickly. It eventually became an 
important source of funds; by 1596 one in four ducats of Crown revenue 
came from silver taxes.
17 These were beyond the Cortes’ control. They 
could also not be used to back long-dated bonds. Instead, silver was 
used to fund short-term borrowing. The timing of silver inflows was a 
key factor in three of the four defaults of Philip’s reign—Figure 1 
shows sizable dips in remittances in the years preceding the 1560, 1575, 
and 1596 bankruptcies. 
  Philip was at war for almost all of his reign. Some military   
endeavors were great successes; others ended in spectacular failure. 
Spanish territories and Spain’s allies paid to a varying extent for   
these military campaigns, but the Castilian treasury was by far the 
largest contributor. In Flanders, disagreements over taxation combined  
with religious issues to produce a full-scale revolt after 1567. Philip’s 
military governor, the Duke of Alba, persecuted Protestants with an  
iron fist, fanning the flames of rebellion. Flemish and Dutch revenue 
fell far short of spending in the Low Countries and the Army of 
Flanders became a major expenditure item in the Castilian budget.   
At the same time, Philip and his allies fought the Ottomans in   
the Mediterranean, defeating them at Lepanto in 1571. Expenses in 
Flanders and in the Mediterranean exceeded available revenue. When 
the Cortes initially refused new taxes, Philip stopped servicing his 
short-term debts in 1575.
18 In the following year, after the death of  
the governor general, Spanish troops mutinied and sacked the loyal   
city of Antwerp. The Flemish and Dutch provinces united against the 
 
17 American silver remittances are examined in Hamilton, American Treasure; and Morineau, 
Incroyables Gazettes. Ulloa, Hacienda, pp. 687–714, provides extensive data on New World 
revenues. For the role of silver in the interaction between the Crown and the Cortes, see 
Drelichman and Voth, “Institutions.” 
18 This discussion is based on Parker, “Spain,” Dutch Revolt, Spain, Grand Strategy, and 





CROWN REVENUES, 1555–1596 
 
Sources: Ulloa, Hacienda; Thompson, War and Society, p. 288; and authors’ calculations. 
 
mutineers, and drove Spanish troops out of large parts of the Low 
Countries. By 1585 Spanish forces recaptured Antwerp and other parts 
of the Netherlands, but the Army of Flanders never conquered all of 
Holland and Zeeland. This was widely blamed on English support for 
the rebels, leading Philip II and his advisors to plan an invasion of 
England with the “Invincible Armada.” Building it cost two years’ 
worth of revenue.
19 When the fleet was destroyed, Spain had to rebuild 
its naval forces, strengthen her fortifications, and repel English and 
French attacks. The additional cost placed a heavy burden on royal 
finances. Despite a new tax (the millones), the king defaulted again in 
1596. 
  Debt was issued in two forms, asientos  and juros. Asientos were 
short-term debt contracts negotiated between the Crown and its bankers. 
Many of them involved transfers of funds abroad. During Philip’s reign, 
they usually included a license to export bullion from Castile, as well as 
protection against a debasement of the currency. The king was often in 
arrears on his asientos. Juros were long-term bonds issued against a 
particular revenue stream, such as the sales taxes of Seville. Because 
 
19 Our calculations, based on Parker, Spain and Army. 
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they were backed by specific tax streams, juros were safer investments 
than asientos; Philip II never defaulted on them. 
  Philip stopped servicing short-term loans one year after his accession. 
He did so again in 1575 and 1596. The first rescheduling unfolded  
in two stages, in 1557 and 1560. The settlement involved the Fugger 
banking family taking control of Crown land and monopolies, and was 
not fully negotiated until 1566, when lending resumed in earnest. Many 
funds were provided by Genoese bankers, who introduced the practice 
of collateralizing asientos with juros. As fighting in the Netherlands  
and in the Mediterranean escalated, so did borrowing. When the Cortes 
refused new taxes, the king once again defaulted on asientos. The total 
outstanding amount was 14.6 million ducats, or two years’ worth of 
revenue. Five and a half million ducats had been collateralized through 
standard juros, while 4.3 million were backed by bonds guaranteed by 
the Casa de Contratación.
20 
  The crisis of 1575 is well-documented.
21 Two years of negotiations 
with the bankers produced a settlement (medio general), converting   
all short-term loans to low interest perpetuities.
 On average, the king  
repaid 62 percent of his debts. The bankers extended fresh credit 
amounting to five million ducats. Lending continued briskly until 1596. 
In that year, Philip suspended payments for the fourth time. The new 
settlement was mild compared to the 1575 default. The medio general 
of 1597 rescheduled 7 million ducats, about 65 percent of yearly 
revenue. Two-thirds of outstanding debt was converted to 5 percent 
juros, and the rest was repaid in full through a juros swap. The king 




  Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Crown’s revenues by type 
between 1555 and 1596 in constant 1565 ducats. Data for individual 
revenue streams between 1555 and 1596 were collected by Ulloa   
and Thompson. For years with missing observations, we assume that 
revenues were equal to the lower of the two closest years with available 
data. We also use information on the frequency of tax collection.
22 
 
20 Income of the Casa de la Contratación was a royal prerogative. The juros issued against these 
revenues are one notable exception to rule that long-term debt had to be backed by Cortes-approved 
ordinary revenue (Ruíz Martín, “Expediente”).  
21  For more details on the suspension and settlement, see Lovett, “Castilian Bankruptcy” and 
“General Settlement”; as well as the online version of this article. 
22 This procedure and Ulloa’s methodology yield a lower bound of actual revenue. Most revenue 
remained constant for long periods. Data for Indies revenue, the most volatile series, are available for 





GROSS VALUE OF NEW ASIENTO ISSUES 
 
Sources: Artola, Hacienda, pp. 86–87; and Archivo General de Simancas, “Contadurías 
Generales,” Legajos 84–92. 
 
  Our new series broadly agrees with existing estimates for individual 
years.
23 With the exception of silver remittances (the topmost category in 
the chart), revenues were largely stable because of tax farming. Tax 
farmers or city councils agreed to fixed yearly payments and became the 
residual claimants. Sales taxes were doubled in 1575 and the millones 
excises were introduced in 1591. Almost the entire volatility of the series 
is driven by silver revenue. The yield of the Potosí mines fluctuated from 
year to year, and these swings were accentuated by difficulties in shipping 
silver across the Atlantic. 
  In each bankruptcy, short-term loans were converted into long-term 
debt. The Crown would issue fresh juros, secured against new taxes voted 
by the Cortes. This also implies that after each general settlement (medio 
general) that ended the bankruptcies, the Crown was free of short-term 
obligations. We will exploit this fact to reconstruct the total debt stock. 
  Figure 2 shows the real gross value of new asientos contracted   
between 1520 and 1596. The new data constructed from the original loan 
contracts in the Simancas Archive begins in 1566.
24 The 1520–1556 series  
 
23 For a more detailed comparison, see the online version of this article. 
24 Archivo General de Simancas, “Contadurías Generales,” Legajos 84–92. This series begins 




FIGURE 3  
LOAN COMPONENT OF NEW ASIENTO ISSUES  
 
Source: Archivo General de Simancas, “Contadurías Generales,” Legajos 84–92. 
 
was assembled by Carande. Previous data on Philip II’s asientos were 
problematic.
 Ulloa’s series suffered from double counting.
25 In addition, 
both Carande’s and Ulloa’s estimates were based on the gross amounts 
mentioned on the front page of the asiento documents, part of which 
involved transfers and exchange operations that did not increase debt. 
  In the absence of reliable data on short-term borrowing, it was 
impossible to reconstruct total debt and annual borrowing accurately. Our 
new series is free of double counting, and we distinguish between actual 
borrowing and other uses of funds. This required analyzing the actual 
clauses in each contract. We conducted the first such systematic analysis 
for all 416 asientos underwritten between 1566 and 1596. Figure 3 shows 
both gross values and loan components. Actual loans averaged 80 percent 
of gross values mentioned on the first page of asientos. Their earlier use 
exaggerated short-term borrowing, especially before 1586. 
 
in 1566, while Carande’s study ends in 1556. The 10-year gap in the archive encompasses 
Philip’s first two bankruptcies. These may have had repercussions for spending, and for dealings 
with the Cortes. The online version reports the nominal data used to construct Figures 2 and 3.  
25 This resulted from the fact that military commanders would take out asientos with financiers in 
the field, and send the documents to Madrid. They would then be reissued, and often consolidated 
with other debt. 822  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
  To reconstruct a full set of fiscal accounts, we need the cost of 
servicing debts. Asientos were convenient as a short-term borrowing 
device; they allowed the Crown to obtain money quickly and transfer  
it to virtually any point in its European dominions. They were also 
expensive. Their median gross rate of return was 14 percent, and   
many contracts cost more than 20 percent. This included compensation 
for currency conversions, overseas deliveries, transportation costs,   
and the risk of late payment and subsequent renegotiation. Many 
asientos used convoluted contractual forms. Much of the return resulted  
from exchange transactions at favorable rates, advance payments by   
the Crown without interest, and swaps of financial instruments. Further 
complicating matters, scheduled repayments seldom specified whether 
they constituted interest or capital installments. Debt service is therefore 
not observable directly. We use an indirect estimation methodology 
instead. 
  First, we transcribed every clause in each of the 416 asientos contracted 
between 1566 and 1596. We thus derived the monthly cash flow agreed  
in the contracts. From the overall set of cash flows in each contract, we 
calculated a modified internal rate of return for the asiento.
26 We then 
estimated the total interest for each contract by multiplying its loan 
component by the rate of return. We also spread the total service of each 
asiento—interest and principal payments—uniformly over the life of the 
contract. This is in line with what the few asientos separating interest   
and principal repayment specify.
27 Annual debt service of the Crown is 
then the sum of these payments for all asiento contracts in force in   
any one year. Since the default of September 1575 stopped payments on  
all asientos, we use a value of zero for 1576 and 1577. The settlement  
of 1577 converted all outstanding asientos into juros; short-term lending 
restarted from scratch in early 1578.
28 
 Juros were normally perpetuities, but lifetime bonds were also issued. 
Many were held by the Castilian nobility and bourgeoisie. With a royal 
license (available for a fee), juros could be traded in a secondary market. 
The value of a juro reflected the reliability of a particular revenue stream. 
Interest rates were typically around 7 percent. Table 1 shows the scant  
 
 
26 See Drelichman and Voth, “Serial Defaults,” for further details. 
27  For a prominent example, see the 5 million ducat loan arranged after the 1575 bankruptcy. 
Asiento y Medio General de la Hacienda. Archivo General de Simancas, “Consejo y Juntas de 
Hacienda,” Libro 42. Modifying this assumption to a pure front-loading of interest has a negligible 
impact on the rest of our estimates. 
28 We report the series of asientos, their loan components, and the estimated debt servicing in 




JUROS AND THEIR SERVICE  
(in millions of ducats) 
Year    Juros Servicing Cost    Outstanding Juro Stock 
1560    1.468    19 
1565    —    25 
1566    1.861    — 
1573    2.752    — 
1575    2.730        42.5 
1584    3.273    — 
1598    4.634    68 
Sources: Debt estimates for 1560, 1565, and 1598 are from Artola, Hacienda, pp. 88–89;  
the figure for 1575 is from Carlos Morales, Felipe II, pp. 142–43. Service estimates are from 
Ruíz Martín, “Expediente,” p. 71; and Ulloa, Hacienda, pp. 828–29. 
 
available data on juros.
29 Since these data are not sufficient to compile 
annual estimates of long-term debt and servicing costs, we will calculate 
them indirectly later. 
  No systematic data on Castile’s expenditure during the sixteenth 
century exist. Civil administration, domestic law enforcement, and the 
maintenance of the royal household constituted a small part of Castile’s 
budget—either because the expense itself was small, or because it was 
borne at the local level. The single largest expenditure item was military 
outlays. We use advances in Spanish military history over the last decade 
to compile comprehensive estimates of military expenditures. In the next 
section, we derive nonmilitary expenditure using an accounting identity. 
  Figure 4 presents our estimates of military expenditure between 1565 
and 1596.
30 Where the cost of an individual campaign differs across 
sources, we chose the estimate supported by better documentation.
31 In 
the early 1570s the War of the Holy League and the growing intensity 
 
 
29 The archives do not permit a full reconstruction of the stock of juros. Existing estimates are 
derived from official inquiries. Most of them were commissioned at the time of the defaults. A good 
overview of existing work is provided by Toboso Sánchez, Deuda. Ruiz Martín, “Expediente” and 
“Finanzas,” and Torres Lopez and Pérez-Prendes, Juros, also offer useful insights. For further 
discussion, see the online version of this article. 
30 The civil administration of overseas territories was generally covered by local revenue. Because 
these costs do not affect Castile’s fiscal position, we do not include them in our calculation. 
31  Castilian spending on the Army of Flanders between 1580 and 1596 is only available as 
quinquennial totals (Parker, Grand Strategy). We do, however, have yearly data for the contributions 
paid by the Flemish treasury. To estimate annual expenditure by Castile, we assume that they moved 
in proportion with Flemish contributions. If we instead divide the quinquennial spending by five, our 







Sources: Calculation based on data from Dandelet, Roma and Spanish Rome; De Lamar, 
Diplomacy; Koenigsberger, Government; Lynch, “Philip II”; Parker, “Spain,”  Dutch Revolt, 
Spain, Grand Strategy, and Army; Tenace, Spanish Intervention and “Strategy”; and Thompson, 
War and Government and War and Society. 
 
of the Dutch Revolt led to a spike in military outlays, which peaked  
in 1574. The 1575 bankruptcy can be seen as its direct consequence.  
The following decade saw relatively limited military expenditure.   
This changed with the resumption of hostilities in the Netherlands in  
1583. Expenditure continued to rise in the run-up and aftermath of the 
Armada. Outfitting it cost approximately ten million ducats, equivalent 
to roughly two years of total revenue. Following the disaster, a similar 
sum was spent on rebuilding the fleet to defend Spain against French 
and British attacks. The 1596 peak—the last year for which our sources 
allow a comprehensive assessment—reflects the response to the threat 































  The previous section summarized available data derived from 
primary sources on revenues, short-term debt and the cost of servicing 
it, and military expenditure. There is also information on long-term   
debt and its servicing for individual years. For a comprehensive view of 
Castilian state finances, series are missing on nonmilitary expenditures, 
long-term debt service, and outstanding debt. We now estimate these 
series based on a combination of historical information, assumptions, 
and the logic of the government’s budget constraint. We then go on to 
analyze the key features of fiscal performance under Philip II.  






t t t t t t t t t R ds ds NME ME R ds E ps ds d R d d N M R d E p d t dt   (1) 
 
where  d is debt, ps is the primary surplus (revenue minus non- 
debt expenditure), ds is debt service, ds
l and ds
s denote long- and short-
term debt service, R is revenue, E is ordinary (non-debt) expenditure, 
ME is military expenditure, and NME is nonmilitary expenditure.   
We have figures for total debt outstanding in 1565, 1575 and 1596.   
Because of the nature of the reschedulings, there was no short-term 
(asiento) debt in these years, and the long-term debt (juros) outstanding 
was equivalent to total debt. We thus know the change in total   
debt during the last 41 years of Philip’s reign. We assume that the   
available information on long-term debt servicing costs (Table 1) is 
representative for the period as a whole. We interpolate debt servicing 
costs on juros linearly, using the data in Table 1.
32 This gives us a   
series for ds
l. After summing up equation 1 over t, it is straightforward  
to solve for the sum of NME, nonmilitary expenditure. The estimated  
sum of nonmilitary expenditure for the 1566–1596 period is 18.7 
million ducats, compared to a total of 146.2 million ducats of military 
expenditure. To convert these estimates into annual figures, we assume 
that real nonmilitary spending was constant throughout Philip’s reign. 
This is a plausible assumption, as most of the expenditures of the civil 
administration and internal law enforcement were fixed.
33 
  We calculate outstanding debt by adding each year’s fiscal balance  
to the previous year’s debt stock. Total debt rose markedly slower   
than the sum of asientos issued suggests. Nominal debt increased by 
 
32 Interpolating the service on juros is not problematic. Juro issuance was capped by ordinary 
revenue, which grew slowly and smoothly (1575 was the exception). Since we have an actual 
observation for 1575, our procedure captures the break in the trend.  
33 Nonmilitary spending was small overall; alternative assumptions have virtually no impact 
on final estimates. 826  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
40.9 million ducats between 1565 and 1596. Over the same period, the 
Crown entered into asiento loans for 92.1 million ducats. Thus, on 
average, a little less than half of asiento borrowing was either rolled 
over into new short-term loans or consolidated into long-term debt. Our 
total debt series closely matches the estimates for individual years in 
Table 1.
34 Table 2 gives an overview of our results.
35 
 Revenues  throughout  Philip’s reign were markedly higher than 
military and nonmilitary expenditure combined. Spending—excluding 
debt servicing costs—amounted to 76 percent of revenue in the 1560s 
and early 1570s, fell to 46 percent in the late 1570s and early 1590s,  
and then increased to 79 percent. Once we take debt servicing   
costs into account, the budget was on average in deficit during Philip’s 
second and fourth decade on the throne, and in surplus during the   
third one. Nominal revenues grew by 52 percent between 1566–1574 
and 1575–1584, and by a further 22 percent over the next decade, for  
a total increase of 86 percent. Over the period as a whole, military 
expenditure more than doubled, and debt increased by 78 percent.  
 In  real  terms,  Philip’s revenues grew by 53 percent over the entire 
period (Panel B), while non-debt expenditure increased by 62 percent. 
In 1575–1584 real military spending had fallen 14 percent relative to 
1566–1574. Philip earned a “peace dividend” after the successful battle 
of Lepanto and the lull in the Dutch Revolt. Castile’s budget swung into 
surplus as a result, having been in deficit in the years 1566–1574. This 
surplus gave way to annual deficits of more than two million ducats  
(in 1565 prices) in the period 1585–1596. During that period, military 
spending more than doubled, driven by the Armada and renewed 
fighting in the Low Countries. In real terms, Philip’s overall debts rose 
by 47 percent between the second and fourth decade of his reign—less 
than the increase in revenues. 
  Arguably, scaling by an economy’s total output is the right way to 
measure the burden of military commitments and debt. However, 
estimating sixteenth-century GDP is difficult—the latest published 
estimates for Castile differ by more than 200 percent between their upper 
and lower bounds.
36 Because of the substantial uncertainty surrounding 
Castilian GDP, we use revenue as a scaling magnitude. Military spending 
was flat relative to revenue—although with strong fluctuations. The debt 
burden rose marginally. Total debt servicing cost amounted to 60 percent  
 
 
34  The mean absolute difference between our estimates of total debt stock and total juro 
borrowing (matched to the nearest year) is 2.1 percent of our estimate. 
35 For the full set of fiscal accounts, see the online version of the article. 




FISCAL ACCOUNTS, 1566–1596 
(period averages) 
  1566–1574  1575–1584  1585–1596 
Panel A (nominal, million of ducats)       
Revenues  5.17  7.88  9.60 
Military expenditure  3.40  3.04  6.95 
Nonmilitary expenditure  0.54  0.59  0.66 
Primary surplus  1.24  4.25  1.99 
Long-term debt service  2.35  3.00  3.91 
Short-term debt service  0.77  0.47  0.79 
Fiscal balance  –1.89  0.78  –2.71 
Outstanding debt  30.35  37.37  54.07 
Panel B (real, million of 1565 ducats)   
Revenue  4.93  6.96  7.52 
Military expenditure  3.18  2.67  5.48 
Nonmilitary expenditure  0.52  0.52  0.52 
Primary surplus  1.23  3.77  1.53 
Long-term debt service  2.23  2.65  3.06 
Short-term debt service  0.72  0.41  0.62 
Fiscal balance  –1.72  0.71  –2.15 
Outstanding debt  28.75  32.96  42.24 
Panel C (% of revenue)   
Military expenditure  65.8  38.6  72.4 
Nonmilitary expenditure  10.4  7.5  6.9 
Primary surplus  24.0  53.9  20.7 
Long-term debt service  45.5  38.1  40.7 
Short-term debt service  14.9  6.0  8.2 
Fiscal balance  –36.6  9.9  –28.2 
Outstanding debt  587.0  474.2  563.2 
Sources: See discussion in text and Appendix E in the online version of this article. The   
deflator used to obtain the real values in Panel B is the Old Castilian price index from 
Drelichman, “Curse.” Panel C was derived from Panel A. 
 
of revenue in the first decade. This fell to 44 percent in the second one, 
and rose slightly to 49 percent in the last one. For the period as a whole, 
Philip II ran average fiscal deficits of approximately 20 percent of 
revenue. While the average deficit in the first period had amounted to 
37 percent, the second period saw surpluses of 10 percent of revenue. 
The decade of the Armada saw a return to deficits of 28 percent on 





 BUDGET BALANCE AND DEBT/REVENUE, 1566–1596 
 
Sources: See the online version of this article. 
 
  Figure 5 shows the primary surplus and fiscal balance side-by-side. 
The run-ups to the bankruptcy in 1575 and to the Armada are associated 
with primary deficits. After the rescheduling in 1577 and the large   
tax hike agreed by the Cortes, surpluses became substantial, varying 
between 50 and 70 percent of revenue. This return to large (primary and 
overall) surpluses was aided by lower military expenditure. Similarly, 
the new excises (the millones) improved Castile’s fiscal position in the 
1590s. Overall, Castile ran primary surpluses equivalent to 32 percent 
of revenues. Despite almost continuous warfare, Philip II almost   
never borrowed to pay interest. Instead, a substantial proportion of his 
revenues was available for servicing his debts, year after year. The only 
exceptions to this were periods of exceptional military effort—the great 
Dutch offensive of the early 1570s, and the Armada.
37  
  That money formed the “sinews of power,” in Cicero’s famous 
phrase, is reflected in the effects of war on overall fiscal balance. 
Revenues could fluctuate from year to year, and did so largely as a 
result of silver windfalls or shortfalls. Debt servicing costs fluctuated, 
 
37 Figure 5 speaks against the “serial default” literature. The 1575 payment stop did not lead 
to a downward spiral of weakening fiscal institutions, as predicted by Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
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depending on the mix of short- and long-term debt, and the financing 
conditions in each market. Yet the prime determinant of the Crown’s 
fiscal position was the scale of its military effort. If we regress pst on 
MEt, we obtain a coefficient of –1.07 (t-statistic 9.4).
38  
  For public debt to be sustainable, revenue and expenditures have to 
allow the servicing of debts in the future. Debt-to-income ratios should 
not rise above levels that are typically considered sensible, given the 
development of the tax system and public debt administration. Philip 
II’s debts did not increase relative to revenue. Taking period averages, 
they fell from 5.9 times annual revenue in 1566–1574 to 4.8 times   
in 1575–1584, before rising to 5.7 times in the final decade. There is 
therefore no evidence of a growing fiscal crisis—revenues rose faster 
than debt.  
  A more systematic approach examines sustainability through the lens 
of primary surpluses necessary to stabilize the debt-to-income ratio. For 
spending and borrowing to be sustainable, the long-run level of the debt 
to GDP ratio ought to be stable. This requires that the government keep 
expenditure (net of the cost of debt service) below revenue. A low cost 
of borrowing and revenue growth can facilitate a favorable outcome. 









dt 1  (2) 
 
where  d is the change in the debt to income ratio, r is the (nominal) 
rate of interest, g is the growth rate of GDP, pd is the primary deficit, 
and ps* is the primary surplus that will reduce  d to zero, thus holding 
the debt-to-income ratio constant.
39 
  The approach in equation 2 can be criticized because the “maximum” 
level of debt is not well defined. The International Monetary Fund 
therefore proposes the following simple measure of sustainable debt: 
 
) /( * g r PS D g P  
 
where D* is the sustainable debt level.
40 The right-hand side is simply 
the discounted value of future primary surpluses, where the discount 
rate is calculated as the difference between interest payments and the 
 
 
38 Using the Newey-West correction does not change results. For three lags, the t-statistic is 
11.6; for 5, 13.5. 
39 Aizenman and Pinto, Managing Economic Volatility. 






















1565–1574  3.38  10.20  0.394  0.249  –0.145  3.645  5.863  2.218 
1574–1584  3.28  9.30  0.433  0.454  0.020  7.534  4.787  –2.748 
1584–1596  3.44  8.80  0.227  0.201  –0.026  3.744  5.728  1.983 
                 
1565–1596  3.37  9.40  0.348  0.315  –0.033  5.229  5.476  0.246 
Notes: The growth rate of revenue is g, r is the interest rate, PS is the actual primary surplus 
relative to revenue, PS* is the surplus required for stabilizing the debt-to-revenue ratio, D is 
actual debt/revenue, and D* is the debt-to-revenue ratio that can be sustained given actual 
primary surpluses. Growth rates are calculated as annualized compounded rates of growth 
between benchmark dates. Hence, the overall rate is not equivalent to the weighted average of 
the growth rates in subperiods.  
 
growth rate. The higher the primary surplus and the growth rate of 
income, the larger the debt that can reliably be serviced.  
  Sustainability analyses are typically performed using GDP to scale 
fiscal variables. We scale by revenue instead. This is because early 
modern government finances are probably best judged not relative to 
national production, but by revenues actually generated.
41 
  Table 3 shows our baseline sustainability results, comparing required 
and actual primary surpluses, as well as possible and actual debt levels. 
The analysis is performed by decade, and for Philip II’s reign overall. 
Primary surpluses for the period as a whole were sufficient to keep 
upward pressure on the debt-to-revenue ratio in check. The primary 
surplus required to stabilize the debt to revenue ratio was 35 percent of 
revenue, which is only slightly higher than the number attained—31.5 
percent. At the time of his death, the Crown’s debt in relation to 
revenue stood where it had been 33 years earlier—at a multiple of less 
than six. Average sustainable debt was 5.2 times revenue, and actual 
levels stood at 5.5 times—a minor difference.  
  During the first decade, primary surpluses were about two-thirds   
of the level necessary for stability. Interest rates were relatively high,  
and revenue grew moderately. Debt levels were higher than could   
be sustained ad infinitum. The second decade, from 1575 to 1584, 
showed a decline in interest rates and a higher growth rate of revenue. 
Reduced military spending allowed primary surpluses to increase 
markedly. They were now higher than necessary to stabilize debt levels. 
Actual indebtedness was below the maximum sustainable level. In the 
 
41 In our robustness tests, reported in the online version, we use several measures of GDP.   Sustainable Debts 831 
  
  
final decade, military events caused expenditure to increase again.   
The primary surplus required for stability fell to 0.23, which is 3 
percentage points (of revenue) higher than the actual number. For the 
period as a whole, sustainability overall was not compromised despite 
near-continuous warfare and major military efforts in the last two 
decades of the sixteenth century. 
  Our conclusion that Philip II’s finances were largely sustainable   
rests on newly collected data, a reworking of existing estimates, and  
the derivation of information from combining these different series.   
At each step, we made assumptions that may affect our assessment.   
Our results are nonetheless robust to a number of alternative scenarios.  
In particular, they survive using alternative measures of revenue growth 
rates; replacing revenue by the best available estimates of GDP as a 
scaling variable; ignoring the reductions in debt stock generated by   
the defaults; and using different estimates for the cost of short-term   
debt service. We provide a full sustainability assessment under each 
alternative scenario in the online version of this article. 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL – THE VALUE OF VICTORY IN THE LOW 
COUNTRIES 
 
  With hindsight, we know that the Armada marked a turning point  
for the worse in Philip II’s finances. Ex ante, it was by no means   
clear that Spain—which had recently routed the Ottoman fleet— 
would fail. While some contemporaries were pessimistic about the 
Armada’s prospects, others took it very seriously. Sir Walter Raleigh 
(together with Sir Richard Grenville) was charged with the defense of 
Devon and Cornwall against the Armada. Writing in 1614, he observed 
that England was “of no such force as to encounter an Armie like   
unto that, wherewith it was intended that the prince of Parma should 
have landed in England.”
42 As Geoffrey Parker observes, had the 
Armada even met with limited success, Spain would have reaped   
large benefits. Attempting to subdue the Dutch Rebellion was arguably 
different. While the Armada was inspired by the need to make progress 
in Flanders, protracted attempts to reconquer Holland cannot be 
construed as an unexpected expenditure shock. We argue that the 
benefits from peace in Holland and Zeeland were such that even the 
prolonged efforts of the Spanish Crown there were not inappropriate   
in an economic sense. Any victory, even at a late stage, would have 
allowed a rapid improvement of Philip II’s finances.  
 
42 Quoted in Parker, Spain. 832  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
  If the chance of ultimate success was higher than zero, then the fiscal 
outcome that we document constitutes a lower bound on the sustainability 
of Castilian finances, reflecting the worst-case scenario in military terms. 
Ex ante, it is not clear why Philip and his advisors should not have 
entertained reasonable hopes of suppressing the Dutch rebellion. Few 
large populous areas had ever broken away from central control in 
Europe—Switzerland being a notable exception. Philip’s empire was the 
superpower of the age. Many contemporaries were convinced that Spain 
would eventually prevail. A successful conclusion of Philip II’s campaign 
in the Low Countries would have allowed a marked reduction in military 
expenditure. In addition, it may have yielded extra revenue as a result  
of being able to tax the rebellious provinces. We hazard conservative 
guesses for both figures, and argue that relatively small changes to actual 
expenditure and revenue would have had a considerable impact on the 
overall state of Philip II’s finances.  
  The lull in fighting after the sack of Antwerp in 1576 illustrates how 
much Castilian finances could change as a result of reduced military 
efforts. During the period 1566–1596, Philip II spent 163 million ducats 
on non-debt expenditures, of which 144.3 went to military expenses.   
Of this, fully 53 percent—77.3 million ducats—was spent on the Army 
of Flanders. During the Armada and its aftermath, from 1587 to 1596, 
expenditure in the Low Countries amounted to 40.6 million ducats. 
During the ten preceding years, when no major military operations   
took place, total expenditure on the Army of Flanders was 16.8 million 
ducats, 59 percent less. We assume that, had the Armada succeeded, 
military expenditure after a Spanish victory would have been similar  
to the figures for 1577–1586. Thus, some 17.6 million ducats could 
probably have been saved from 1589 on. Note that our calculations 
provide a lower bound on the reduction in expenses that would have 
followed the Armada’s success, as our figures continue to count the cost 
of rebuilding the decimated Atlantic fleet. Excluding it would have 
saved another 5.56 million ducats after 1588.
43  
  Additional tax revenue is a more speculative source of improvement 
in Philip II’s finances. Victory over the rebellious provinces would   
have allowed Philip to tax them. We take the estimates of tax revenue  
in Holland compiled by Wantje Fritschy. To err on the side of caution, 
we assume that Castile would not have been as efficient in taxing its 
reluctant subjects as they were themselves. Therefore, we reduced the 
tax estimates by 50 percent. Accordingly, most of the change in Philip’s 
 
43 Victory in Flanders could have worsened Philip’s fiscal position only if it had led to even 
more, high-intensity warfare with England. While not impossible, we consider this unlikely. 





VICTORY IN FLANDERS – COUNTERFACTUAL DEBT/REVENUE PATHS 
 
Sources: See the text. 
 
fiscal position would have reflected lower expenditure (saving 2.5 million 
ducats in 1596) than higher revenue (adding 0.53 million).
44 
  To examine the impact of lower expenditure and higher revenue on 
such a scale, we recalculate overall expenditure, the fiscal balance, 
primary surpluses, and total debt, for each year. As a result of victory in 
the Low Countries, Philip could have ended his reign with debts of 39 
million ducats instead of 66 million. The debt-to-revenue ratio would have 
resumed the downward trend it was on before the plan for the Armada was 
put into motion. Figure 6 shows the two counterfactuals. The first uses 
only lower military expenditure, while the second adds possible revenue 
from Holland. 
The key reason why Philip’s finances would have looked healthy by the 
end of his reign would have been less war, not more taxes. Thus, the 
Armada made good sense in fiscal terms ex ante. This is not to say that 
fiscal considerations were key. It simply implies that religion or strategy 
need not be the only motives why the Armada seemed a promising project 
at the time. 
 
44  This is a conservative calculation. We do not know how much money a victorious 
Habsburg Empire would have extracted from the Dutch provinces. Dutch taxes on themselves 
averaged 2.6 million ducats in 1600–1650 (Fritschy, “‘Financial Revolution’”). In the final year 



















  We now compare the state of Castile’s finances with that of other 
major European states at the height of their power, using a variety of 
indicators. We chose three cases—Holland, France, and Britain. Table 4 
gives an overview, drawing on a variety of sources from Bonney’s 
European State Finance Database. 
  A measure often used in assessing the strength of fiscal systems is the 
debt service-to-revenue ratio.
45 We explore Castile’s position relative   
to that of other early modern European powers.
46 The Netherlands   
marks one extreme with an average debt service-to-revenue ratio of 68 
percent.
47 France is at the opposite end of the spectrum, with a relatively 
low ratio of 38 percent in the eighteenth century.
48 However, this 
excludes the period prior to the 1720 rescheduling, when servicing costs 
reached 80 percent of revenue. Sixteenth-century Castile has a ratio   
of 51 percent. This makes it more similar to the United Kingdom than to 
the Netherlands.
49 Compared to the other great powers in early modern 
Europe, Castile was not spending a particularly high proportion of its 
revenue on debt service.  
  The same conclusion emerges when we examine the maximum  
debt service-to-revenue ratio. This ratio peaks at 75 percent for Castile, 
and at 70 percent for Britain.
50 France saw a maximum of 81 percent.
51 
The Netherlands sustained very high levels of close to 200 percent for  
a short period while it accumulated debts during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. 
  Castilian tax revenues grew quickly—more quickly than in the 
United Kingdom or Holland. If we compare the Castilian figure with  
tax increases in the other countries, we see that fiscal pressure grew at  
a high rate—approximately twice as fast as in the United Kingdom 
during the eighteenth century. This is all the more remarkable since 
 
 
45 Sargent and Velde, “Macroeconomic Features.” 
46 Our data allows us to compare Castile to other European imperial powers when each was at 
the peak of their power. Yun Casalilla, Marte, compares Castile to other contemporary European 
nations. 
47 Calculated from the data in the European State Finance Database compiled by t’Hart, “United 
Provinces.” 
48 Inferred from Figure 1 in Sargent and Velde, “Macroeconomic Features.” 
49 We compare the cases of Spain and the United Kingdom in somewhat greater depth in 
Drelichman and Voth, “Debt Sustainability.”  
50  By 1815 Britain’s debt/GDP reached 185 percent, according to Barro, “Government.” 
We exclude the Napoleonic Wars. This biases our results against finding high fiscal pressure in 
France and Britain. 
51 By the late eighteenth century, France had a lower ratio than Britain, amounting to 52 
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+ Per capita tax as a percentage of income of an unskilled laborer, as calculated by De Vries and 
Woude, First Modern Economy. 
 ++ Based on data used for Velde, “John Law’s”; as provided by the author.  
+++ Sargent and Velde, “Macroeconomic Features”; table 1.  
* GDP based on the lower bound in Alvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, “Decline.”  
** GDP from Carreras, “Modern Spain.” 
*** Based on data by Weir, “Tontines”; as compiled by Crafts, “Exogenous or Endogenous 
Growth.”  
**** GDP data from Crafts, “Exogenous or Endogenous Growth.”  
Notes: Data taken from Bonney, European State Finance Database. Fiscal data from Mitchell, 
British Historical Statistics.  
 
historians have long held up Britain’s willingness to raise taxes as   
one of the key factors for its success in the wars with France.
52 
Maximum fiscal pressure in Britain and Castile was comparable even if 
we use the most pessimistic GDP figures for the latter. Using the most 
recent estimates by Carlos Alvarez Nogal and Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura, revenue/GDP was half of the British figure, and markedly 
lower than in Holland. Debt/GDP ratios (tentative as they are) suggest  
that total indebtedness in Spain was markedly less than in the United 
Kingdom. Castile’s primary surpluses were very high, even by the 
elevated English and French standards.
53 Scaling by revenue does not 
alter our conclusions. In 1801, for example, Britain’s debt stood at a 
 
52 Brewer, Sinews; and O’Brien, “Mercantilist Institutions.” 
53 Prerevolutionary France also returned to primary surpluses, if only for a time. See White, 
“Was There a Solution?” 836  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
multiple to revenue of 13.7.
54 Our findings about the relative fiscal 
health of European powers echo those of White.
55  
  We conclude from international comparisons that there was ample 
room for Castile’s tax/GDP ratio to grow, and grow it did. Strikingly, 
ordinary expenditure did not catch up with revenue. While Castile’s 
fiscal infrastructure was not as highly developed as Holland’s or 
Britain’s, revenue growth provided breathing room to cope with high 
debts. Castile’s success in raising revenue was a key determinant of its 





  In this article, we present comprehensive annual fiscal accounts for 
Castile between 1566 and 1596. These series are based on new archival 
data, earlier estimates, and a simple national accounting framework. 
Hand-collected data on short-term borrowing allows us to derive debt 
servicing costs. Based on these, we calculate deficit figures and fiscal 
surpluses, as well as an annual series of debt outstanding. Our estimates 
represent the earliest reconstruction of full annual fiscal accounts for 
any state in history. 
  “Military overstretch” has served as a key explanation for the rise  
and fall of great powers. Also, a series of defaults is often viewed   
as detrimental to the development of a country’s institutions and 
economy. For both hypotheses, sixteenth-century Castile has been used 
as a prime example. Our new data show that Castile’s fiscal position 
was much healthier than is commonly believed. The fragmentary nature  
of existing evidence, combined with eye-catching defaults, created a 
negative impression that is not supported by a detailed reconstruction  
of Philip II’s finances. Debt rose during his reign, but so did revenue; 
debt-to-revenue ratios stayed broadly constant. Far from excess fiscal 
pressure undermining the foundations of Spanish imperial might, rising 
revenue simply kept up with growth in population and incomes.
56 This, 
in itself, is a remarkable fact. While some years saw high expenditure—
reflecting the Duke of Alba’s big push in the Netherlands, and the 
Invincible Armada—Philip II’s wars did not put state finances on an 
unsustainable path. This is partly because the growth of expenditures 
lagged behind the rise in revenues. While debt accumulated, primary 
surpluses grew. Philip II ran primary surpluses in all but three years of 
 
54 Mitchell, British Historical Statistics. In 1822 the ratio still stood at 12.96.  
55 White, “France.” 
56 On this point, see also Bilbao, “Ensayo.”   Sustainable Debts 837 
  
  
his reign, helping the debt-to-revenue ratio remain constant over time. 
We conclude that Spanish debts were sustainable throughout. 
  In comparison to other early modern European states, Castile’s 
finances in the sixteenth century were not particularly strained. 
Although it spent more than the United Kingdom on servicing its   
debts (relative to GDP), Castile fared better than the Dutch Provinces. 
And while total tax pressure was similar to the United Kingdom, 
maximum debt relative to revenue was actually lower. Castile’s fiscal 
performance was sustained by restrained expenditure, resulting in 
consistently large primary surpluses. These amounted to almost a third 
relative to revenues—a much higher ratio than in the United Kingdom.  
  In light of our findings, the bankruptcy of 1575 appears as little more 
than a temporary setback. The suspension of payments was triggered by  
a strong increase in military expenditures in the two preceding years.   
The 1576 tax increase and the 1577 settlement effectively corrected the 
problem. Between 1577 and 1584 the fiscal indicators behaved similarly 
to the preceding two decades; growing debt was met with an increasing 
primary surplus, and the deficit was kept under control. While the   
period after the 1575 bankruptcy saw consolidation, the fiscal situation 
deteriorated somewhat after 1588, when Philip decided to undertake the 
“Enterprise of England.” The enormous cost of outfitting the Armada sent 
the budget into the red, virtually eliminating the primary surplus. After 
1588 the threat of British attacks required more military spending. The 
introduction of new excises and record silver remittances ameliorated   
the king’s fiscal position, but the outbreak of the Elizabethan war halted  
any significant improvement in Castile’s finances. Yet, despite these 
stringencies, the final bankruptcy in 1596 involved smaller “haircuts” for 
lenders and affected a smaller amount of debt than in 1575. At the time of 
Philip’s death, the debt-to-revenue ratio was actually lower than it had 
been in 1566. 
 That  Castile’s debts were sustainable is an important finding for   
the history of sovereign debt. The king clearly could pay his bankers,  
given the overall health of his finances. With this result in hand, the next 
question is why a powerful monarch like Philip II mostly honored his 
debts? Our findings thus prepare the ground for other studies that examine 
what sustained sovereign lending in the case of early modern Castile. 
James
  Conklin concluded that Genoese bankers could punish Philip   
by withholding transfer services. Alvarez Nogal argued that a centrally 
promoted cooperative market structure was responsible for access to 
credit.
57 Elsewhere, we conclude that the sanctions view is not supported 
 
57 Conklin, “Theory”; and Alvarez Nogal, “Role.” 838  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
by the evidence. Instead, the importance of access to funds in the future, 
combined with incentives for lenders not to undermine a moratorium in 
case of default, made lending sustainable.
58  
  Our results also shed light on the nature of serial defaults. Reinhart, 
Rogoff, and Savastano argue that countries go bankrupt repeatedly 
because deeper parameters in their political and social environment make 
repayment difficult. Borrowing, for them, can be unsafe even at low 
levels. Default episodes may have important negative knock-on effects on 
growth and the quality of fiscal institutions. Chris Sims points out that 
even serial defaults may be an efficient equilibrium outcome, and that 
there is only limited evidence that bankruptcies harm fiscal institutions.
59 
Spain’s history of 13 defaults between 1550 and 1900 serves as a prime 
example in the serial defaults literature. Our results suggest Castile’s  
early defaults occurred at a time of reasonable fiscal probity and broadly 
healthy financial conditions. While it is possible that the effect of later 
Spanish bankruptcies undermined its fiscal and economic position, the 
events in our period do not suggest that the quality of fiscal institutions 
suffered. Since the king used the defaults as a negotiating device to raise 
taxes on the cities, suspensions ultimately helped strengthen the fiscal 
powers of the Spanish state.  
  During the period of our study, the Spanish empire was at the   
height of its powers. It also saw the forging of Philip II’s  “grand 
strategy” and the unraveling of Spanish hegemony in the wake of 
military setbacks.
60 To contemporaries, it was not clear that Philip   
II’s strategy in the Netherlands would fail. Had it succeeded, the vast 
military expenditures used in the ultimately futile bid to subdue the 
rebels could have been saved. In addition, the rich cities of the Low 
Countries might have been taxed. Had the invasion of England been 
carried out successfully, the Crown would have saved the expense of 
building a second fleet, and possibly gained additional tax revenue. The 
defeat of 1588 dealt a sharp blow to Castile’s military and financial 
position. In this sense, hopes of servicing all debts to the letter of each 
contract did not flounder on the rocks of fiscal recklessness and 
ineptitude, as suggested by earlier scholarship. They sank together with 
the Armada’s ships in the English Channel. These findings suggest that 
bankers need not have been foolish or exuberantly optimistic to lend to 
Philip II. Ex ante, their chances of being repaid were probably at least 
 
58 See Drelichman and Voth, “Lending to Borrower.” Important contributions to the theory of 
sovereign debt using historical episodes include Tomz, Reputation; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 
“Supersanctions”; and Eichengreen and Portes, “Settling Defaults.”  
59 Sims, “Comments.”  
60 Parker, Grand Strategy.   Sustainable Debts 839 
  
  
as high as those of investors in British consols in the early nineteenth 
century. At that point in time, British government debt had reached almost 
two times GDP.
61 That Spain would eventually hold the record for serial 
default, and that Britain would emerge as a textbook example of fiscal 
probity, may owe more to success or misfortune on the battlefield than to 
differences in “fiscal discipline.” 
 




Aizenman, Joshua, and Brian Pinto. Managing Economic Volatility and Crises: A 
Practitioner’s Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Alvarez Nogal, Carlos. “The Role of Institutions to Solve Sovereign Debt Problems: 
The Spanish Monarchy’s Credit (1516–1665).” Working Paper, Universidad Carlos 
III de Madrid, 2003. 
Alvarez Nogal, Carlos, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura. “The Decline of Spain 
(1500–1850): Conjectural Estimates.” European Review of Economic History 11, 
no. 3 (2007): 319–66. 
Artola, Miguel. La Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen. Madrid: Alianza, 1982. 
Barro, Robert J. “Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices, and Budget Deficits  
in the United Kingdom, 1701–1918.” Journal of Monetary Economics 20, no. 2 
(1987): 221–47. 
Bilbao, Luis María. “Ensayo de reconstrucción histórica de la presión fiscal en Castilla 
durante el Siglo XVI.”  In  Haciendas Forales y Hacienda Real: homenaje a 
Miguel Artola y Felipe Ruiz Martín, edited by Fernández de Pinedo y Emiliano 
Fernández, 37–61. Universidad del País Vasco, 1990.  
Bonney, Richard. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 ______. European State Finance Database. 1995–2007. http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/ 
(accessed 23 August 2007). 
Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II. Second Revised Edition. Glasgow: William Colins & Sons, 1966. 
Brewer, John S. The Sinews of Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988. 
Carande, Ramón. Carlos V y sus banqueros. 3 vols. Barcelona: Crítica, 1987. 
Carlos Morales, Carlos Javier de. Felipe II: El Imperio en Bancarrota. Madrid: 
Dilema, 2008. 
Carreras, Albert. “Modern Spain.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, 
edited by J. Mokyr, 546–53. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Carretero Zamora, Juan Manuel. Cortes, monarquía, ciudades: Las Cortes de Castilla 
a comienzos de la época moderna (1476–1515). Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1988. 
Conklin, James. “The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain Under Philip II.” Journal 
of Political Economy 106, no. 3 (1998): 483–513. 
 
 840  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
Crafts, N. F. R. “Exogenous or Endogenous Growth? The Industrial Revolution 
Reconsidered.” The Journal of Economic History 55, no. 4 (1995): 754–72. 
Dandelet, Thomas James. Roma Hispanica: The Creation of Spanish Rome in the 
Golden Age. Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1995. 
______. Spanish Rome, 1500–1700. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 
De Lamar, Jensen. Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the 
French Catholic League. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964. 
De Vries, Jan, and Ad Van der Woude. The First Modern Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Drelichman, Mauricio. “The Curse of Montezuma: American Silver and the Dutch 
Disease.” Explorations in Economic History 42, no. 3 (2005): 349–80. 
Drelichman, Mauricio, and Hans-Joachim Voth. “Debt Sustainability in Historical 
Perspective: The Role of Fiscal Repression.” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6, no. 2–3 (2008): 657–67.  
______. “Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain.” In Institutions and 
Economic Performance, edited by E. Helpman, 120–47. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
______. “Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt and Default in the Age of Philip II, 
1556–1598.” Working Paper, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2010. 
______. “Serial Defaults, Serial Profits: Returns to Sovereign Lending in the Age of 
Philip II.” Working Paper, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2010.  
Eichengreen, Barry, and Richard Portes. “Settling Defaults in the Era of Bond 
Finance.” World Bank Economic Review 3, no. 2 (1989): 211–39. 
España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de Simancas. Sections: “Contadurías 
Generales 2a Epoca” and “Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda.” 
Ferguson, Niall. The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–
2000. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Fortea Perez, José Ignacio. Las Cortes de Castilla y León bajo los Austrias: una 
interpretación. Junta de Castilla y León, 2009. 
Fritschy, W. “A ‘Financial Revolution’ Reconsidered: Public Finance in Holland During 
the Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648.” Economic History Review 56, no. 1 (2003): 57–89. 
Gelabert, Juan. “Castile, 1504–1808.” In The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–
1815, edited by R. Bonney, 201–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Grossman, Herschel I., and John B. Van Huyck. “Sovereign Debt as a Contingent 
Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation.”  American Economic 
Review 78, no. 5 (1988): 1088–97. 
Hamilton, Earl J. American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934. 
Hoffman, Philip T., and Kathryn Norberg. Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative 
Government, 1450–1789. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook. Washington: IMF, 2003. 
Jago, Charles. “Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile.”  The American 
Historical Review 86, no. 2 (1981): 307–26. 
______. “Philip II and the Cortes of Castile: The Case of the Cortes of 1576.” Past & 
Present 109 (1985): 22–43. 
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987. 
Koenigsberger, H. G. The Government of Sicily Under Philip II of Spain: A Study in 
the Practice of Empire. London: Staples, 1951.   Sustainable Debts 841 
  
  
Lapeyre, Henri. Simón Ruiz et les “asientos” de Philippe II. Paris: Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1953. 
Las Cortes de Castilla y León en la Edad Moderna. Valladolid: Cortes de Castilla y 
León, 1989. 
Lovett, A. W. “The Castilian Bankruptcy of 1575.” The Historical Journal 23, no. 4 
(1980): 899–911. 
______. “The General Settlement of 1577: An Aspect of Spanish Finance in the Early 
Modern Period.” The Historical Journal 25, no. 1 (1982): 1–22. 
Lynch, J. “Philip II and the Papacy.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 11 
(1961): 23–42. 
Marcos Martín, Alberto. España en los siglos XVI, XVII, y XVIII. Barcelona: Crítica, 
2000. 
Mitchell, Brian R. British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988. 
Mitchener, Kris J., and Marc D. Weidenmier. “Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt 
Repayment.” Journal of International Money and Finance 29, no. 1 (2010): 19–36. 
Morineau, Michel. Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux metaux. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 
Nadal i Oller, Jordi. La población española: siglos XVI a XX. First corrected and 
augmented ed. Barcelona: Ariel, 1984. 
O’Brien, Patrick K. “Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit: The 
Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756–1815.” In The Fiscal Military State 
in Eighteenth-Century Europe, edited by C. Storrs, 167–200. Farnham and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 1997. 
Ormrod, W. M., Richard Bonney, and Margaret Bonney. Crises, Revolutions, and 
Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History. Stamford: Shaun 
Tyas, 1999. 
Parker, Geoffrey. “Spain, Her Enemies, and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559–1648.” 
Past & Present 49, no. 1 (1970): 71–95. 
______. The Dutch Revolt. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. 
______. Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659. London: William Collins & Sons, 
1979. 
______. The Grand Strategy of Philip II. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University 
Press, 1998. 
______.The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Roady, 1567–1659: The Logistics of 
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ War. 2nd edition. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Reinhart, Carmen M., Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano. “Debt Intolerance.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003, no. 1 (2003): 1–74. 
Ruiz Martín, Felipe. “Un expediente financiero entre 1560 y 1575: La hacienda de 
Felipe II y la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla.” Moneda y Crédito 92 (1965): 3–
58. 
______.  “Las finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II.”  Cuadernos de 
Historia, Anexos de la Revista Hispania 2 (1968): 181–203. 
Sargent, Thomas J., and Francois R. Velde. “Macroeconomic Features of the French 
Revolution.” Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 3 (1995): 474–518. 
Sims, Chris. “Comments on ‘Debt Intolerance.’”  Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 2003v, no. 1 (2003): 63–74. 842  Drelichman and Voth 
  
  
Tenace, Edward Shannon. The Spanish Intervention in Brittany and the Failure of 
Philip II’s Bid for European Hegemony, 1589–1598. Ph.D. diss., University of 
Illinois, 1997. 
______.  “A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish 
Struggle for European Hegemony.” English History Review 118 (2003): 855–82. 
t’Hart, Marjolein. “The United Provinces, 1579–1806.” In The Rise of the Fiscal   
State in Europe, c. 1200–1815, edited by R. J. Bonney, 309–26. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
Thompson, I. A. A. War and Government in Habsburg Spain. London: The Athlone 
Press-University of London, 1976. 
______.  War and Society in Habsburg Spain: Selected Essays. Brookfield: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 1992. 
______.  Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions, and Representation in Early 
Modern Castile. Aldershot: Variorum, 1993. 
______.  “Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism, and Liberty.” In Fiscal Crises, 
Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1994. 
______.  “Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis.” In Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and 
Representative Government, 1450–1789, edited by P. T. Hoffman and K. Norberg, 
140–80. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
Toboso Sánchez, Pilar. La deuda pública castellana durante el Antiguo Régimen (juros) 
y su liquidación en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1987. 
Tomz, Michael. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across 
Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Torres López, Manuel, and J. M. Pérez-Prendes. Los Juros (aportación documental 
para una historia de la deuda pública en España). Fábrica de Moneda y Timbre, 
1963. 
Tortella, Gabriel, and Francisco Comín. “Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Spain 
(1600–1900).” In Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old World to the New: 
Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the Seventeenth Through the Nineteenth 
Centuries, edited by M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde, 140–86. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Ulloa, Modesto. La hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II. 2 ed. Madrid: 
Fundación Universitaria Española, Seminario Cisneros, 1977. 
Velde, Francois R. “John Law’s System.” American Economic Review 97, no. 2 (2007): 
276–79. 
Weir, David R. “Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 
1688–1789.” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 1 (1989): 95–124. 
White, Eugene. “Was There a Solution to the Financial Crisis of the Ancien Regime?” 
The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 3 (1989): 545–69. 
______. “The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 1770–1815.” 
The Journal of Economic History 55, no. 2 (1995): 227–55. 
______.  “France and the Failure to Modernize Macroeconomic Institutions.” In 
Transfering Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World, edited by M. Bordo 
and R. Cortes Conde, 59–99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Yun Casalilla, Bartolomé. “El Siglo de la Hegemonía Castellana (1450–1590).” In 
Historia Económica de España, Siglos X–XX, edited by F. Comín, M. Hernández 
and E. Llopis, 51–83. Barcelona: Crítica, 2002. 
______. Marte contra Minerva: El precio del imperio español, c. 1450–1600. Barcelona: 
Crítica, 2004. 